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IT'LL TAKE MORE THAN A MIRACLE:
INCOME IN SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1979-1987
by Chris Tilly and Randy Albelda

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Through the 1980s, the Massachusetts economy grew rapidly. Most
Massachusetts families benefited from this economic boom, and saw their
But Massachusetts
incomes rise much more rapidly than the U.S. average.
single mothers and their children, who started out with lower incomes than
other families, experienced only minimal income growth, and fell further
behind other families in the Bay State. Current policy has hindered rather
than promoted these families' ability to improve their incomes.
Between 1979 and 1987, income (adjusted for inflation and family size)
in Massachusetts grew by 22%, far outstripping the 7% growth of income in the
nation as a whole. Over the same period, single mothers' income slid from 41%
of the Commonwealth average to 37%.
Even at the peak of the Massachusetts
boom, almost half of single-mother families fell below the poverty line.
The Massachusetts income miracle was primarily an earned income miracle,
but single mothers do not have the same opportunities to earn as other
families.
Single mothers suffer from a "triple whammy" in the labor market:
they have children (which increases their income need, while decreasing the
paid hours they can put in), their families include only one working-age
adult, and the adult is female each of which depresses a family's earning
power.
Too little paid work is not the problem Contrary to popular myth,
single mothers, on average, worked the same number of hours per year as wives
in two-parent families with children: 900 hours annually.

—

.

In addition, single mothers have added earnings disadvantages compared
to wives in two-parent families: for example, their average education falls
behind that of wives by about two years; their average age falls about four
years behind. The single mothers who receive Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) are especially disadvantaged: compared to single mothers who
do not receive AFDC, they have almost three years less education and are five
years younger on average.

Other sources of income, like child support payments, are extremely
small, and have fallen over time.
Of single mothers receiving AFDC, over half
have never been married, greatly decreasing their chances of receiving any
child support at all. And while the majority of single mothers rely on
government transfers, benefit levels are too low to pull many of them out of
poverty. Among single mothers, only 20% of those below the poverty line
before transfers get pulled out of poverty by transfer payments. Furthermore,
benefits are reduced dramatically with any earned income so that for every
additional dollar of adjusted income single mothers earned through higher
wages or expanded work effort, they lost one third of it in decreased
transfers.

We suggest policy changes in the following three areas:
EARNINGS:

Because of the limits on single mothers' ability to work and on their
earning power, work requirements cannot be the mainstay of welfare policy.
Instead, several steps could help single mothers to make work pay.

Welfare-employment program should stress education in addition to short-term
training in order to raise their earning power in the long run. In addition,
continuing and extending subsidized child care will help single mothers to
work more hours.
•
Current federal policies reduce the AFDC grant by one dollar for every added
dollar of earnings after adjusting for limited work-related expenses.
"Fillthe-gap" budgeting at the state level would allow working single mothers to
keep more of their own earnings.
•
Current Massachusetts tax policies exempt married-coupled families (with or
without children) from income taxes up to a higher income threshold than oneparent families, even if the single parent family has more members. This
saddles single mothers with an unfair tax burden, and should be amended by
granting a higher single parent filing status.

CHILD SUPPORT:
As with earnings, federal policies reduce the AFDC benefit by one dollar
for every added dollar of child support (after the first $50).
In any case,
child support payments are generally small, depend on the income of the absent
father, and are unavailable for many single mothers.
While child support
should be strongly encouraged, the state should guarantee a minimum level. To
that end we recommend that Massachusetts:

Develop policies that use state payments to provide a floor for child
support payments, as has been initiated in Wisconsin and New York.

GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS:
Because AFDC benefit levels are not pegged to inflation, the real value
of the average Massachusetts AFDC grant has fallen by 25% between 1978 and
1990.
The state should:
Index AFDC grants to inflation as a first step toward adequate benefits.

Our research shows that even at the peak of the Massachusetts boom,
single mothers did very poorly. Now, in the depths of recession, they are
surely doing much worse. Massachusetts should use the policy instruments at
its disposal to assist single mothers and their children.
It will take more
than a miracle to enable single mothers to meet their families' needs.

IT'LL TAKE MORE THAN A MIRACLE:

INCOME IN SINGLE -MOTHER FAMILIES IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1979-1987

by Chris Tilly and Randy Albelda
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DETAILED SUMMARY

Through the 1980s, the Massachusetts economy grew rapidly. Most
Massachusetts families benefited from this economic boom, and saw their
But Massachusetts
incomes rise much more rapidly than the U.S. average.
single mothers and their children, who started out with lower incomes than

other families, experienced only minimal income growth, and fell further

behind other families in the Bay State.
In this paper, we analyze income
differences among family types in Massachusetts. We pay special attention to
the problems of single mothers, and offer a set of policy recommendations to

address these problems.
In order to undertake this analysis, we classify Massachusetts families

into six types based on the presence of children, number of adults and gender

and age (if 65 or older) of the head.

We also break down each family's

income into four categories: earnings, property income, alimony/child support,
and government transfers.

In order to provide a fair comparison of incomes

for families of different sizes, we adjust income for family size, terming the

result "adjusted" income.

We compare data from 1987, the peak of the

Massachusetts "miracle" to that of 1979, the height of the preceding economic
expansion.

Our findings show that single-mother families' incomes fell behind those
of all other family types during the expansion in the 1980s, which bodes

poorly for their position during the recession.

The reasons why income in

single-mothers families did not improve much relative to others is that they
are severely limited in the degree to which they can improve their sources of

income.

Current policy has hindered rather than promoted these families'

ability to improve their incomes.
Our results fall in five main areas which are summarized below:
1)

Comparison of Massachusetts with the United States

The share of all Massachusetts families accounted for by each family type
are quite similar to the shares in the nation as a whole.
•
In 1979, average adjusted family income in Massachusetts was essentially
But between 1979 and 1987, adjusted income
identical to the national average.
in Massachusetts grew by 22%, far outstripping the 7% growth of income in the
nation as a whole.

Over three fourths of the growth in Massachusetts income was due to rising
earnings; almost all of the remainder can be attributed to growth in property
and pension income.
2)

Comparison of family types in Massachusetts

Families consisting of two or more adults with no children have the highest
adjusted income in Massachusetts. But two-adult families with children saw
faster growth in adjusted income between 1979 and 1987, and single men had the
fastest income growth of all.
•
Families headed by someone 65 years or older and single women with no
children had lower adjusted incomes, and experienced only modest income
growth.
•
Single-mother families were worst off in 1979, and fell farther behind other
In both dollar income and
Massachusetts families between 1979 and 1987.
adjusted income, single mothers receive only about one fourth as much as
childless two-adult families. Single mothers' adjusted income gain was less
than one sixth the size of single men's gain.

Between 1979 and 1987, single mothers' adjusted income slid from 41% of the
Commonwealth average to 37%. Even at the peak of the Massachusetts boom,
almost half of single-mother families fell below the poverty line.
3)

Why single mothers have such low incomes

Earnings income:
•
Single mothers suffer from a "triple whammy" in the labor market: they h*v«
children, their family includes only one working-age adult, and the adult la
female each of which depresses a family's earning power.

—

Having children requires either purchasing child care or taking time to
care for children. When a family has more than one adult, it has more
time to devote to the labor force or to child care, but single mothers
lack this advantage.
On the average, an added working-age adult adds 1400 hours annually to
the total number of hours a family devotes to the labor force. Having a
child aged five or less subtracts about 500 hours.
(For comparison, a
full-time, year-round job occupies 2000 hours.)

While husbands and single men in the labor market averaged $16.06 per
hour in Massachusetts in 1987, wives and single women averaged only
$10.31.

Contrary to popular myth, single mothers, on average, worked the same number
of hours per year as wives in two-parent families with children: 900 hours
annually.

Single mothers have added earnings disadvantages compared to wives in twoparent families: for example, their average education falls behind that of
wives by about two years; their average age falls about four years behind.
The single mothers who receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Compared to single mothers who do not
receive AFDC, they have almost three years less education and are five years
younger on average.
(AFDC) are especially disadvantaged.

Child support:
Child support payments to single mothers are extremely small, and have
fallen over time. Of single mothers receiving AFDC, over half have never been
married, greatly decreasing their chances of receiving any child support at
all.

Government transfers:
•
Although the majority of both single mothers and elders depends on
government transfers, the Social Security benefits provided to elders are much
more generous than the AFDC payments to single mothers. Of elders falling
below the poverty line before transfers, government benefits lift more than
three quarters out of poverty. Among single mothers, only 20% of those below
the poverty line before transfers are pulled out of poverty by transfer
payments.
If elders were to receive the same level of transfers as single
mothers, transfers would only bring 29% of pre-transfer-poor elders above the
poverty line.
4)

Why single-mother family incomes grew so little in the 1980s

The Massachusetts income miracle was primarily an earned income miracle, but
single mothers do not have the same opportunities to earn as other families.

Other families also benefited from a rise in property and pension income,
but single mothers' average gain in this type of income was about one fortieth
as large as the average family's gain.
In the aggregate, for every additional dollar of adjusted income single
mothers earned through higher wages or expanded work effort, they lost one
third of it in decreased transfers.
51

Policy implications

Earnings:
Because of the limits on single mothers' ability to work and on their
earning power, welfare-to-work policies cannot be the major component of
welfare policy.

Providing education in addition to short-term training will help to raise
single mother's earning power in the long run while continuing and extending
subsidized child care will help them to work more hours.
•
Current federal policies reduce the AFDC grant by one dollar for every added
dollar of earnings, after adjusting for limited work-related expenses. This
makes it more difficult for single mothers to work their way out of poverty,
and undermines the incentive to work.
"Fill-the-gap" budgeting at the state
level would moderate this problem.
•
Current Massachusetts tax policies exempt married-coupled families (with or
without children) from income taxes up to a higher income threshold than oneparent families, even if the single parent family has more members. This
saddles single mothers with an unfair tax burden, and should be amended by
granting a higher single parents filing status.

Child Support:
As with earnings, federal policies reduce the AFDC benefit by one dollar
for every added dollar of child support (after the first $50).
In any case,
child support payments are generally small, tied to the income of the absent
father, and are unavailable for many single mothers.
"
Other states are developing policies that use state payments to provide a
floor for child support payments; Massachusetts should follow suit.

Government transfers:
Because AFDC benefit levels are not pegged to inflation, the real value
of the average Massachusetts AFDC grant has fallen by 25% between 1979 and
1990.
•
Indexing AFDC grants to inflation would be a first step toward adequate
benefits.

Our research shows that even at the peak of the Massachusetts boom,
single mothers did very poorly.
Now, in the depths of recession, they are

Massachusetts should use the policy instruments at
its disposal to assist single mothers and their children.
It will take more

surely doing much worse.

than a miracle to enable single mothers to meet their families' needs.

IT'LL TAKE MORE THAN A MIRACLE: INCOME IN SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES IN

MASSACHUSETTS 1979-1987

I

.

INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts economy experienced rapid growth in most of the 1980s,

in sharp contrast to the poor economic performance of the 1970s and the

current slump.

This growth, popularly dubbed the Massachusetts "miracle",

was experienced by most families as a period of low unemployment rates and

rising personal income.
In this paper, we examine income, adjusted for family size and

inflation, for six different family types in Massachusetts in 1979 and in 1987
and compare them to the same family types in the entire United States (the

income adjustment and family types are described in the next section)

Our

.

analysis reveals two important trends: First, on average, families in

Massachusetts experienced large income growth relative to families in the US,
attributable primarily to earnings gains. Second, not all families shared in
this tremendous growth.

In particular, Massachusetts families headed by

single mothers show virtually no gain in total income, despite growth in

earned income such as wages and salaries.
The second trend receives most of the attention in this paper for two
reasons.

The economic expansion of the 1980s increased the income disparity

between single mothers and all other family types.

This in itself is a

significant economic change that requires the serious attention of policymakers.

But even more important, our data reveal that although economic

growth and recovery helps many families improve their economic situation, for
single mothers, it will take more than a "miracle."

In other words,

wrong to presume that "a rising tide lifts all boats."

it is

Our research shows

that in the 1980s single mothers and their children were left beached.

Single mothers face three important barriers to gains in the paid labor
force that combined pose a "triple whammy."

These are:

children, they need to support others and provide care

1)

as families with

— either

paid or unpaid-

-requiring more income and/or time than families without children to maintain
a

comparable standard of living,

2)

single-mother families have only one adult

to both earn income and take care of children, and 3) as female workers,

single mothers face lower average wages than do male workers.

In addition, we

find that single mothers have an even greater wage disadvantage than other

women workers, since they lag behind in education and experience.

So while

expanded economic opportunity creates the potential for tremendous income
growth, for single mothers to take advantage of that potential requires jobs

that pay adequate wages and available supports to enter the workforce

— neither

of which existed in the 1980s or now.

Now that the regional and national economies are in the midst of a

recession and the state's fiscal crisis weighs heavy on Massachusetts
residents, a closer look back at the relative income gains made by

Massachusetts families may seem like old

— if

not irrelevant

— news.

However,

the trends discussed here will shed light on some of the toughest policy

questions facing the legislature and the Weld Administration
single-mother families.

— those

concerning

Even in the best of economic times, welfare policies-

-like welfare-employment programs and child support rules

— have

not helped to

improve single-mother families' incomes and the economic downturn only makes

matters worse.
Our research shows that welfare policies which emphasize more work by

mothers will provide only marginal income gains for single mothers under
current welfare legislation.

Contrary to popular myth, our data suggest that

single mothers exhibit relatively strong labor market attachment
that of other mothers.

— as

strong as

Even so, when poor single mothers take paying jobs

they often fail to receive wages that support themselves and their families

more as a result of their gender than of marital status or fertility.
Additionally, if they receive government transfers (which are not taxed),

every dollar of earned income (which may be subject to state taxation) reduces
their subsidy by close to a dollar, after adjusting for certain work-related
expenses.

This has two very undesirable effects: more earned income is not

being accompanied by less poverty, and the state is sanctioning unnecessary

disincentives to paid work. We offer several policy options which would
enhance single-mothers' ability to improve earnings, not through more work but
by effectively boosting wages.

Actively pursuing child support and alimony from absent fathers sounds
like an alternative solution, but in fact our data reveal that this source has

very limited income potential for single-mother families and will likely
remain so given the current guidelines concerning child-support.

For those

mothers not receiving payments, the court-ordered payments from absent
fathers' incomes are usually not high enough to sustain families. Furthermore,

court-ordered payments are re-established infrequently, allowing child support
payments to erode with inflation.

We suggest that the state actively pursue

child support payments but also assure a minimal level of child assistance

regardless of the state's ability to collect that payment.

Despite the active promotion of earnings income and child support,
single-mother families still face very high levels of poverty.

One reason is

that income support from the major anti-poverty income program available to

single-mothers and their children
(AFDC)

— has

been reduced.

— Aid

to Families with Dependent Children

The reduction is due in part to sharp reductions in

transfers accompanying any rise in earnings, and in part due to erosion caused
by inflation.

We recommend that the state allow women to keep more of their

benefits when they do work and that the benefit level be adjusted annually for
inflation.
II.

DATA
We distinguish our six family types based on characteristics that shape

their access to income. These include the number of adults, the presence of
children, and the age and gender of the head.

For purposes of our

comparisons, we consider persons who are not living with relatives to be

single person "families." 2

nicknamed in Table

1

below.

The family types we use are summarized and

TABLE

1

Definition of family types
Number of
Adults
2 or more
1 Male
2 or more
1 or more
1 Female
1 Female

Family tvpe
MAR-NC
MALE-NC
MAR-C
ELDER
FEMALE-NC
FEMALE-C

Number of
Children
none
none
1 or more
none
none
1 or more

Age of
Head
under 65
under 65
all ages
65 or older
under 65
all ages

To
NOTE: Heads in MAR-C and FEMALE-C families may be 65 years or older.
include all dependents we defined FEMALE-C families as having at least one
child under 18 or an adult (other than the household head or spouse) 65 or
older.
One category, single men with dependents (MALE-C), were excluded
because the Massachusetts sample size was too small for statistical

reliability.

Our data comes from a large and extensively used source on personal
income collected by the United States Department of Commerce
of the Current Population Survey (CPS)

collects information from about
States.

1

— the

March sample

(the Annual Demographic Survey), which

out every 1500 families in the United

From the CPS we obtain data on 1979 and 1987, two years that roughly

correspond to the end of the boom period of the last two major business
cycles. These two years provide good comparisons on the net impact of the

economic boom in Massachusetts that extended roughly from 1983 to 1987.
Since we are interested in examining relative and potential gains from

different types of income, we have aggregated and analyzed income from four
distinct sources: earnings; property and private pension income; child support
and alimony; and government transfers.

Different family types will have

differing access to these types of income. Earnings are income from paid
labor

— wages,

salaries and self -employment income

— and

are by far the largest

source of income for most families. Family earnings largely depend on the
number of adults and children there are in the family and the wage levels of

available jobs. Property income
income

— derives

— including

interest, dividends and rental

from ownership (inherited and accumulated) while pensions

represent income from past savings.

While inherited wealth (and the income

derived from it) is not a function of family structure, accumulated wealth and

pensions often are. Families with older members will have more of both.
Interfamily transfers

— child

support and alimony

— represent

a

relatively small

percentage of family income, but are included here since much emphasis has
been placed on this form of income in state policy discussions about single
Finally government transfers are based

mothers and income support programs.

on public policies. Government transfer income includes Old Age, Survivors,

and Disability Insurance (commonly referred to as Social Security), Aid to

Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Insurance
(SSI), Veteran's Benefits, Unemployment Insurance,

Two major programs

— Social

eligibility requirements.

Security and AFDC

— have

and Worker's Compensation.
age and family composition

We have not included non-cash contributions to

family income such as food stamps and employer's contributions to health

insurance and pensions.

Table

(and the graph on the cover page) depicts total income for each

2

Massachusetts family type in our two comparison years, 1979 and 1987, adjusted
for inflation (using 1987 dollars).

While the relative sizes and changes over

time are revealing, comparing total family incomes across families presents a

major problem.
different needs.

Families with the same total family income may have very
One family may have more family members, one may have

members that require substantial resources (like college tuition and child
care), and another may face very different housing costs.
not provide a comprehensive way to measure need.

measure

— the

number of persons in a family

family's basic needs.

— as

Our data set does

Instead we use the standard

the main determinant of a

The most readily available and extensively used measure

of subsistence need which is adjusted for family size is the official poverty
line.

Since the early 1960s, the United State government has used the same

procedure to determine the poverty line

— the

1961 minimally adequate food

budget for families of different sizes multiplied by three and then annually

adjusted for inflation.

In other words each family has its own separate

poverty line, based on the family's size and composition.
poverty line is adjusted for inflation.

Every year the

TABLE 2
Average money income, adjusted income, and
average family size of Massachusetts
families by family type 1987

Average
Money
Income

Family
Tvoe

MAR-NC
MALE-NC
MAR-C
ELDER
FEMALE-NC
FEMALE-C
Total

Average
Adjusted
Income*

$51,210
26,863
50,270
20,404
20,876
13,214

6.03
4.55
4.23
3.18
3.53
1.56

34,945

4.18

Average
Family
Size
2.5
1.0
4.2
1.6
1.0
2.6

* Average adjusted income is the average of each family's total income
divided by its poverty line.

Source

:

Authors' computation from CPS tapes.

The income figures presented in this paper are the average of each

family's income divided by its poverty line. We refer to this income-to-needs

ratio as "adjusted" income.

So,

for example, if a family's total income is

equal to its poverty line, adjusted income is equal to

1.

Table

2

provides

total family income, adjusted income and average family size for families in

Massachusetts in 1987.
As Table

2

indicates, the relationship between total family income and

adjusted income depends on the size of the family.
adjusted income but very different average sizes
very different total family income.

Two families with similar

— MALE-NCs

and MAR-Cs

— have

Since MAR-NC and FEMALE-C families are on

average of similar sizes, the disparity in their total income is also

reflected in the difference in adjusted income.

MAR-NCs (families comprised

of at least two adults with no dependents under 18) had income, on average,

that was 500 percent above the average poverty line while FEMALE-Cs

— female-

headed households, on average, had income just 60 percent above the poverty
line.

Tables in Appendix A include the average poverty levels, total money

income and percent change in money income by family type in Massachusetts and
the United States for 1979 and 1989.

III. MASSACHUSETTS VERSUS THE UNITED STATES

Massachusetts and the United States are quite similar in the relative
shares of different family types within the population, and the trends in

these shares over time.

Table

3

lists the percentage share of each family

type in Massachusetts and the nation as a whole in 1979 and 1987.

Massachusetts has slightly more ELDER and FEMALE-NC families than are
distributed nationally, and fewer MAR-Cs.

The proportions of FEMALE-Cs, MAR-

NCs, and MALE-NCs, however, are almost identical.

In both the United States

and in Massachusetts, the decline in proportion of MAR-Cs and rise in FEMALE-

NC and MALE-NC families are the most notable changes.

While nationally the

percentages of ELDERs and FEMALE-Cs have grown, the growth rates are higher in
Massachusetts.

The total percentage of families with dependents (MAR-Cs and

FEMALE-Cs) is declining both nationally and in Massachusetts, while the total

percentage of persons under 65 living without relatives is rising.

TABLE 3
Percent Distribution of Family Types
Massachusetts and the United States, 1979 and 1987
1979

MAR-NC
MALE-NC
MAR-C
ELDER
FEMALE-NC
FEMALE-C
Source
Note;

;

L987

MASS
20.8%

US
21.4
11.6
32.0
18.9
9.7
5.6

11.9
31.1
19.8
10.2
5.3

US
21.4%
13.3
28.1
19.5
10.6
6.0

MASS
21.2%
12.7
26.7
20.9
11.8
6.1

Authors' computation from CPS tapes.
Totals add to less than 100%, since single father families are omitted.

Graph

1

illustrates average adjusted income for all families in

Massachusetts and the United States in 1979 and 1987.

In 1979 average

adjusted income for Massachusetts and the United States as a whole were

virtually identical

— 3.4

times the average poverty line for families in

Massachusetts compared to 3.3 times the average poverty line for all families
in the United States.

The components of income were also quite similar, with

earnings somewhat higher in Massachusetts.

By 1987, Massachusetts average

adjusted income grew rapidly, particularly in comparison to the gains made by
the rest of the country. This income growth reflects the dramatic expansion of
the Massachusetts economy.

Average adjusted income in Massachusetts grew by 22% between the two
years to 4.2 times the average poverty rate, compared to the modest 7% growth

experienced by the United States as a whole (to 3.5 times the poverty rate).
Over three-fourths of the growth in Massachusetts adjusted income was

attributable to increases in earnings income.

The rest is almost exclusively

attributable to gains in property and pension income.

While there was a

slight increase in average government transfer income in the United States, it
fell very slightly in Massachusetts.

Overall, in comparison to the United

States as a whole, Massachusetts income growth truly does appear miraculous.
IV. WHO'S MAKING IT IN MASSACHUSETTS

However, not all families shared equally in the Massachusetts "miracle"
as is illustrated in Graph 2.

impressive income gains.

On the one hand, several family types scored

MAR-NCs (with two or more working-age adults and no

dependents) kept their place at the top of the income ranking, with adjusted
income that rose 14% from 5.25 times the poverty line to over 6 times the

poverty line.

But MAR-C (two adults with dependents) posted even more rapid

income gains, climbing 27%, from 3.3 to 4.2 times the poverty line.
(single men) climbed fastest of all, shooting up by more than 40%

to 4.5.

MALE-NCs

— from

3.2 up

For each of these family types, by 1987 the Massachusetts average

adjusted income towered above the national average by approximately one

poverty line unit.
However, the good news did not extend to all family types.

Bay State

ELDERs (families headed by persons 65 years and over) and FEMALE-NCs (single

women with no children) saw income improvements, but even in 1987 their
incomes stood around three times the poverty line

averages for their family types.

— not

far from the national
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Doing worst of all were Massachusetts FEMALE-Cs (single mothers):
between 1979 and 1987, they gained less than one fifth of a poverty line unitAs of 1987, the average Bay State

-far less than any other family type.

FEMALE-C was dangerously close to the margin of survival, with an income of
only 1.6 times the poverty line

— again,

far less than any other family type.

Indeed, many FEMALE-C families fell below the margin: 48% of Massachusetts

single mothers had incomes below the poverty line in 1987.

And unlike some

other Bay State families, Massachusetts single-mother families enjoyed little
income advantage over single mothers in the rest of the country: the

Massachusetts advantage as of 1987 was less than one-twentieth of a poverty
line unit.

Why have Massachusetts single mothers fared so poorly, even during the
boom years?

Largely because the reductions in transfer payments experienced

over the decade were not overcome by earnings or child support. Single mothers
face several impediments in the labor market: they have children which

increases their needs and proscribes their time, their family includes only
one working-age adult, and the adult is female

family's earning power.

— each

of which depresses a

In addition, compared to other women in the labor

market, single mothers tend to have still more disadvantages on the earning
front

— for

example, on average they are younger and have less education.

Finally, the safety nets society has decreed to assist those in need

assistance and child support/alimony

— offer

— public

only very limited help to single-

mother families.
A.

Earnings

— including wages
farm — is by far the

Earnings
business or

and salaries and proprietors' income from a

most important source of income for

Massachusetts residents, accounting for 80% of average total income in 1987.
To a large extent, welfare policy has emphasized boosting work effort to

increase earnings.

Yet, as we show below, single mothers have always

exhibited and continue to exhibit a strong commitment to the labor force.
fact,

it is hard to imagine, given the cost of child care, more work effort
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In

from someone raising children.

Our data reveal that single-mother families

provide substantial labor effort, but it does not pay off largely because of
labor market discrimination and fewer skills.
1.

Family size and composition

Families with more adults can earn more.

Compare childless one-adult

families (MALE-NCs, FEMALE-NCs) with childless two-adult families (MAR-NCs):

MAR-NCs earn far more (Graph 2).

By the same token, two-adult families with

dependents (MAR-Cs) out-earn one-adult families with dependents (FEMALE-Cs)

9

Furthermore, families with children earn less than those without, for

two reasons.

First, we measure adjusted income by dividing income by needs

(with needs specified by the family's poverty line), and children increase a

family's need without increasing its earning power.

So in 1987 Massachusetts

MALE-NCs earned less than MAR-Cs in actual dollars, but their income adjusted
for need was higher than that of MAR-Cs.

Second, parents with young children must either purchase child care from

other providers, or spend time out of the labor force to provide the care
directly.

And those costs are not trivial; the Massachusetts Office for

Children estimates the average cost of child care in Massachusetts to be $4500
per year.

A single woman without children can readily go to work; for a

single woman with children, it's more difficult.

Even if children are in

school, they require some care (after-school care and meals,

for example)

which will often limit a mother's work hours and/or job possibilities (for
example, the distance from work she can travel for a job) both of which will

depress earnings.

These constraints apply to all mothers, but are

particularly acute for single mothers when there are no other adults to share
dependent care responsibilities.
For a more direct look at how the number of adults and the presence of

children affects a family's earnings potential, we examined more closely the
number of hours family members spend in the labor force annually.

We use

total hours in the labor force (including time laid-off or looking for work as

well as time spent working, and adding up the hours for every member of the
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family) as a measure of the family's total labor effort.

Regression analysis

allows us to estimate the average effects of the number of adults and

dependents on a family's labor effort.
Table 4 shows those results and, as expected, having more adults in the
family allows families to devote more time to the labor force,

just as having

young children compels families to spend less time on paid work. On the
average, having one more adult increases hours in the labor force by 1300-1400

hours per year (for comparison, a full-time, year-round job takes 2000 hours

per year)

.

Not surprisingly, for adults aged 65 or older this increase is

Compared to

canceled out, since these adults are most likely retired.
families with no children, those with a child aged under
less time in the labor force on the average

—a

than one fourth of a full-time, year-round job.

3

years spend far

drop of over 500 hours, more
Families whose youngest child

is aged 3 to 5 also spend about 500 fewer hours in the labor force, but the

effect is smaller for families with a child aged 6 or above.

Comparing 1979 and 1987 reveals the impact of
women's labor force participation.

a

continuing rise in

Since more women, including those with

young children, are working in the later year, the average hours per adult

climbed and the decrease in hours due to children aged three and up declined.
Even so, Massachusetts families in both years exhibit the same general
patterns.
In terms of total hours worked, the Commonwealth's elder families

averaged the fewest hours worked

— about

640 hours per year in 1987.

Single-

mother families did a little better, working a family average of 962 hours,
compared to an average for all families of 2262 hours.

Single-mothers do work

less than other families, but the difference does not stem from laziness or an

affinity for welfare

— they

simply have less opportunity to work.

In fact, single mothers worked almost exactly as many hours per year as

wives in two-parent families (MAR-C): single mothers put in 898 hours per
year, compared to the wives' average of 902 hours. 10

Wives work more hours

than single mothers when the youngest child is aged less than six, but single
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Table 4
AVERAGE CHANGE IN TOTAL ANNUAL FAMILY HOURS IN THE LABOR FORCE
RESULTING FROM DIFFERENCES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE
One more
One more
Youngest
Youngest
Youngest

adult
adult
child
child
child

in the family
aged 65 or over
aged 2 or less
age 3 to 5*
^

aged

6

or over

1979
1334
-1325
- 537
- 530
- 259

1987
1401

-1440
- 544
- 484
14

Effect of youngest child is computed compared to families with no child.
Source; Authors' computation from CPS tapes, using regression analysis.

mothers take the lead in families with older children, underscoring the
difficulties posed by raising young children and holding down a job with only
one adult in the family.
2

.

Gender

An additional strike against single-mothers' earning opportunities is
that the one working-age adult of the family is a woman.

In fact, there is a

clear earnings hierarchy: for each hour worked, working-age men earn more than

working-age women, who earn more than elders, who earn more than children
under 18 (see Table 5).

Working-age women in Massachusetts only earn about

two-thirds as much per week worked as do working-age men, due in part to
occupational segregation and discrimination.

1

Since single-mother families

only include working-age women, children, and elders, they suffer a clear

disadvantage in the wage levels they can command and hence their total
earnings.

These data should dispel myths about the inadequacy of singleparenthood: single fathers, because men command higher wages than women, are

much more able to support families, even when their hours are reduced.

Table 5
AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS
FOR DIFFERENT FAMILY MEMBERS
(All Massachusetts families, 1987)

Principal male (husband or single man)
Principal female (wife or single woman)
Elder (over 65, not principal male or female)
Child (under 18)
Source: Authors' computation from CPS tapes.
13

Average hourly earnings
$16.06
$10.31
$
$

6.88
3.60

3.

Additional earnings disadvantages

In addition to the problems noted above

— having

only one working-age

adult in the family, the burden of child care, and women's reduced earning

power

— Massachusetts

single mothers have characteristics that additionally

depress their earnings.

Table

6

PREDICTED CHANGE IN HOURLY EARNINGS OF PRINCIPAL FEMALE
RESULTING FROM DIFFERENCES IN HER CHARACTERISTICS
(All Massachusetts families, 1987)

Characteristics
1 added year of education
1 added year of age
Black
Latino ethnicity
Central city residence
Rural residence

Predicted dollar change in hourly earnings
+
+
+

.89
.05
.96

-2.02
-

.62

-1.23

Source ; Authors' computation from CPS tapes, using regression analysis.
Note;
Regression includes only principal females with earnings greater than
zero.
Age effect is computed at the mean age. Effects of central city and
rural residence are computed relative to suburban residence.
Not all women are equal in the labor market.

Table

6

presents results

from regression analysis which estimates how much education, location, age,

race and ethnicity contributes to the differences in women's earnings. 12

Education has the most powerful impact on a Bay State woman's hourly earnings:
the predicted difference in hourly wage between a woman with a 12th grade

education and one with four years of college is $3.56 (four years of education
x $.89 per year).

Increasing age (and presumably the maturity and work

experience that come with it) also add to earnings on the average.
The figures representing the predicted hourly earning differences associated

with race, ethnicity and location indicate the difference between a woman who
has the characteristic to one who does not.

For example, a latina women is

expected to earn $2.02 less than a non-latina.

Interestingly, once holding

all other characteristics constant, black women earn more per hour on average

than comparable white women in Massachusetts, perhaps because black women tend
to spend more time in the labor market, giving them greater experience and
14

more access to stable jobs.

1

"3
J

Both central city and rural residents lag

suburbanites in hourly wages.

With the relative importance of these characteristics in hand, it is
easy to see why single mothers earn less than other mothers. Table

7

compares

the profiles of the two groups of women based on these and other

characteristics.

In terms of almost all of these characteristics influencing

earning power, Massachusetts single mothers stand at a disadvantage compared
Bay State single mothers are

to wives in two-parent families with children.

younger and less-educated than MAR-C wives.

Single-mother families are also

more likely to live in central cities or rural areas, and are more likely to
be latinas.

The only characteristic pointing to higher hourly wages for

Table 7
AVERAGE CHARACTERISTICS OF SINGLE MOTHERS COMPARED
TO AVERAGE CHARACTERISTICS OF WIVES IN TWO-PARENT FAMILIES
(Massachusetts, 1987)
Single mothers
Income characteristics
Average hours worked
per year
Average hourly wage
Average annual earnings
Average family income
Adjusted family income
Family poverty rate

898
8.33
$ 7918
$13214
1.6
47.5%

$
$

$

Characteristics affecting waqe
Education
Age
Percent black
Percent latino
Percent in central cities
Percent in rural areas

Wives, two-parent
902
10.43
9536

$50214
4.2
4.6%

11.4
32.6
12.3%
22.8%
50.4%
16.2%

13.3
36.7
4.4%
3.6%
31.3%
11.0%

Source ; Authors' computation from CPS tapes.
Note:
The product of the average hours worked and average hourly wage do not
equal the average annual earnings (which is the average of the product of
hours worked and hourly wage). This is not a mistake, but rather a property
of deriving means.
single mothers than for wives is that a larger percentage of single mothers
are black

— but

single mothers' other disadvantages clearly outweigh this.

Our regression equation estimates would predict that if single-mothers
had all the characteristics of other mothers, they would be earning $3.11 more
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than they currently do. The actual wage difference is $2.10, suggesting that

Massachusetts single mothers have found ways to offset part of the wage gap.
In addition to comparing single mothers with wives,

it is instructive to

take a closer look within the FEMALE-C category, contrasting single mothers
who receive AFDC with those who do not (Table 8).

4

Not surprisingly, AFDC

recipients in Massachusetts have less earning power than single mothers not

receiving AFDC

— particularly

due to lower levels of education.

Table 8
AVERAGE CHARACTERISTICS OF SINGLE MOTHERS WHO RECEIVE AFDC
COMPARED TO AVERAGE CHARACTERISTICS OF SINGLE MOTHERS WHO DON'T
(Massachusetts, 1987)

Single mothers
receiving AFDC
Education
10.0
Age
30.0
Percent black
18.2%
Percent latino
33.6%
Percent in central cities
69.6%
Percent in rural areas
18.4%
Charac. affecting wage

Other characteristics
Number of children
Percent with youngest child
aged less than 6
Percent never married

Single mothers
not receiving AFDC
12.7
35.1
6.8%
12.4%
32.6%
14.1%

1.8

1.4

58.2%
53.2%

34.4%
18.6%

Source; Authors' computations from CPS tapes.

Furthermore, AFDC recipients face more constraints on their working time

than do single mothers who end up not receiving AFDC.

As Table 8 shows,

recipient mothers have a higher average number of children, and are more
likely to have young children

— both

of which make it more difficult to get out

of the house.
B)

Government transfers, property income, and child support/ alimony

So far, many of the barriers to higher income for Massachusetts single

mothers apply with equal or greater force to elder families.

working-age adults.
single mothers.

ELDERs have few

Indeed, ELDER adjusted earnings do fall below those of

However, total income includes more than wages: it also

includes government transfer payments such as Aid to Families with Dependent

Children (AFDC) and Social Security, property income such as interest and
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rent, private pensions, and inter-family transfers such as alimony and child

support.

Once these additional income sources are added to the balance,

elders fare far better than single mothers and their children.
Both single-mother and elder families enjoy some amount of government

assistance
Security.

— the

former chiefly through AFDC, the latter chiefly through Social

But in Massachusetts

— and

across the country

— social

security is a

far more generous program than AFDC, especially after adjusting for need.

Almost all (95%) Bay State elders received some form of government transfers
in 1987 compared to 57% of all single-mother families.

Of those receiving

this type of income, ELDERs received on average more than one poverty line
unit while transfers to single-mother families amounted to just over one-half
of a poverty line unit.

Of 1987 Massachusetts elder families whose income

would have fallen below the poverty line without government transfers, 77%
were lifted out of poverty by those transfers, leaving elders with a poverty
rate of 11%.

For single mothers, only 20% of the pre-transfer poor are moved

out of poverty by transfers, resulting in a final poverty rate of 48%.

To illustrate the difference in transfers to ELDERs versus FEMALE-Cs, we

simulated what would happen if Massachusetts elder families, instead of

receiving their actual transfer income, instead received the average transfer
income of a single mother.

If ELDERs were given the average of the actual

dollar amount single mothers receive ($4715 in 1987), the fraction lifted out
of poverty falls from 77% to 45%.

But since elder families are generally

smaller than single-mother families, a more reasonable simulation would assign

ELDERs the average FEMALE-Cs

f amilv-size-adiusted

transfer payments.

The

bottom line: only 29% of elder families starting out below the poverty line
would be helped out of poverty by payments at this level
single-mother families themselves

— resulting

—a

plight similar to

in a 32% poverty rate.

When it comes to property income, Massachusetts elder families received
more than twice as much as the average family (after adjusting for need) in
1987.

Families headed by persons 65 and over are more likely to have built up

income-producing assets

— whether

in the form of interest-earning bank
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accounts, stocks and bonds, or a multi-family house

other family types.

— over

a lifetime than

They are also more likely to draw private pension income,

which we count as property income.

Conversely, single-mother families

received less than one-seventh as much adjusted property income as the average
family.

Given their minimal earnings from work, single mothers have little

chance to accumulate income-producing wealth.

What about alimony and child support?

Single mothers are far more

likely to receive child support/alimony than other Bay State families: in
1987, about one in three received payments from an ex-husband and/or absent

father, compared to only one family in 20 overall.

Child support /alimony payments are small

— about

But this is cold comfort.

one-half of a poverty line

unit for single-mother families that receive them

— and

have fallen over time.

Such payments add only a tiny amount to the average single-mother family's
income.

And as Table 8 shows, most single mothers receiving AFDC have less

hope of any payment from an absent father, since the majority

recipient single mothers
V.

— were

— unlike

non-

never married.

LEFT OUT OF THE MIRACLE
We pointed out earlier that although all family types gained from the

Massachusetts boom economy, single mothers gained far less than others.
Single-mother families' adjusted income rise between 1979 and 1987 was about

one-fifth the increase enjoyed by the Commonwealth's average family.

Now that

we have explained why the level of single-mother families' income falls so far

below that of other families, we turn to the reasons why the growth of their
income also lagged behind during these prosperous years.

The reasons for single mothers' slow adjusted income growth are closely

related to the reasons they have low incomes in the first place.

The

Massachusetts income miracle was primarily an earned income miracle: 77% of
the 1979-87 adjusted income jump for the average Bay State family was

contributed by earnings.

And in turn, 100% of the average adjusted earnings

increase came from higher weekly earnings. 15

FEMALE-Cs' adjusted weekly

earnings (in poverty line units) went up by an amount comparable to other
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families.

But as we pointed out above, single mothers work many fewer weeks,

since they have only one adult plus the burden of child care responsibilities.
Thus, the payoff of higher weekly earnings for single mothers was much smaller

than for other families.

Single mothers did increase the number of weeks they

worked, but only by a modest two-thirds of a week on average.

Massachusetts families also profited from

a

°

surge in property income,

accounting for 23% of the total adjusted income rise between 1979 and 1987.
But once more, single-mother families were left out, due to their lack of

income-producing assets.

FEMALE-Cs' average rise in adjusted property income

was about one-fortieth as large as the average family's gain.

What's more,

even single-mother families' increase in adjusted child support /alimony was
smaller than the statewide average.
Finally, Bay State single mothers' progress in the labor market

limited

—-was

— however

offset by the loss of government transfers, chiefly AFDC.

Between 1979 and 1987 the proportion of single mothers receiving transfers

dropped from 68% to 57%, and the average grant to recipients (measured in

poverty line units) also fell.

For every additional unit of adjusted income

single mothers earned through higher wages or expanded work effort, they lost

one-third of a unit in decreased transfers.

Part of this decline can be

attributed to the federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981,
which boosted the cut in AFDC that accompanies any increase in earnings, and
part reflects the fact that AFDC payments are not automatically adjusted for
inflation.

Other families were not hit as hard by diminishing transfers: in

fact, ELDERs' average adjusted transfer income increased by about as much (in

poverty line units) as FEMALE-Cs' adjusted transfer income decreased

.

The net result is that during the miracle years, single mothers fell

even farther behind other Massachusetts families in economic terms.

The

income gap between the average single-mother family and the average

Massachusetts family widened from

2

to 2.6 poverty line units.

Looking at it

another way, single-mother families' income (adjusted for need) slid from 41%
of the Commonwealth average to 37%.
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VI. WHAT MIGHT BE DONE

Massachusetts has been a leader among the states in terms of its higher
than average welfare grants, its innovative Employment and Training (ET)

Choices program
absent fathers.

,

and its active role in collecting child support from

But even these programs and the economic expansion have

boosted single mothers' adjusted income only marginally.

As the recession

wallops the Massachusetts economy, unemployment rates and the number of poor
families are on the rise.

In good and bad economic times, earnings,

government transfers and child support provide only minimal income security
The reforms suggested here

for single mothers and their children.

— in

truth

only marginal adjustments affecting earnings, child support or AFDC benefits
by themselves will not significantly improve the economic well-being of most

single-mothers and their children.

Eventually, all states and the national

government must embark on a long-term strategy which recognizes the
impediments single mothers and their children face in meeting their basic
human needs.

In light of federal inaction, the states have played and will

continue to play an important role in reforming welfare policy.
As we have argued and shown, the impediments to improving total income
of single-mother families are enormous.

Current welfare policies have been

insufficient and in some instances create new barriers.

Below we consider the

limits of current policies in Massachusetts as they pertain to the three main
forms of income

— earnings,

child support and benefits

— and

suggest options for

reform.
A.

Earnings income
1.

The limits to welfare-to-work programs

Welfare reform in the 1980s centered on promoting welfare-to-work
programs.

At the national level, policy makers were reluctant to improve

benefits and turned to other forms of income

— namely

earnings. As discussed

above, a major economic problem facing single-mother families is that even

when mothers work, they do not earn enough to support their families.

mothers will have a very hard time working their way out of poverty,
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Single

especially if benefits are sharply reduced as earnings increase, suggesting
that welfare-employment policies, including workfare, cannot be the major

component of welfare policy
As Table

7,

.

comparing women in families with children, indicates,

employment will not solve the welfare problem for several reasons.

Single

mothers work as much as other mothers, on average, yet their families' incomes
are barely above the poverty line.

What distinguishes a single mother is that

she is usually the only person in her family working for wages, whereas other

mothers usually work to supplement their husbands' earnings.
The real issue for single mothers is not that they do not work enough,
but that when they work their wages

support a family.

— like

those of many women

worth

too low to

For the state to improve single mothers' earnings, then, it

should move toward improving their effective wages
worked.

— are

— not

increasing the hours

Short of a strategy which boosts all women's wages, like comparable

— the

state can promote the skills that will improve women's earnings.

Single mothers' earnings shortfall is correlated with their extremely low
level of educational attainment.

Table

9

supplements Tables

7

and

8,

and depicts the percentage of all

principal females (heads or wives) in non-elder families and all single

mothers distributed by the highest grade completed.

The table breaks down

single mothers further into those with and without AFDC.

The low levels for

single-mothers with AFDC are particularly striking: just under half of all

women receiving AFDC have completed high school, while only one out of every
ten AFDC mothers have had any college education.

This compares to less than

one fifth of non-recipient single mothers without high school level education
and well over one third with some college.
Finally, to the extent that single mothers might be expected to increase

their work effort, unavailability of child care constitutes a major obstacle.
Table 4 illustrates that families with children work fewer hours; single

mothers are no exception.

Until more widespread and affordable child care
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options are available, the time required for child care limits single mothers'
earnings.

TABLE 9
Average educational attainment and
Percent distribution of highest grade completed
for Single Mothers in Massachusetts, 1987
All
Women*

Average years
completed
Less than 12
Completed 12 years
College 1-4
Over 4 years college

13.,3
12. ,7%
38. 9
36..4
12.,2

Single mothers
w/out AFDC
w/ AFDC
12.7
10.0
49.9%
39.9
9.0
1.2

18.6%
45.8
29.9
5.8

•This includes female heads and spouses in all families not headed by someone
65 years and older.

Source: Authors' calculation from CPS data.

2.

Options for reform
a.

Stress education in welfare-training programs

Education for AFDC recipients will pay off in higher earnings over
the long run.

Initially, state policy that emphasizes education for its

welfare recipients will unavoidably lose money.

Women's foregone earnings due

°
to enrollment in school will necessitate additional state support. l ft

However, the economic returns in the future will likely be substantial.

The

higher the level of education for women the less likely they are to depend on
AFDC.

In the long run, providing education will cut down on AFDC recidivism,

and help single mothers become taxpayers rather than transfer recipients.
b.

Subsidized child care

Child care is a necessity for working mothers of young children
rich.

— poor

or

In married-couple families there are either two incomes (including an

often higher male income) to help pay for child care, or one parent to stay
home (even part-time) while the other is still earning a full-time income.

Single mothers, however, enjoy neither of these advantages.
It is unreasonable to expect the state to demand a mother participate in

work programs if there is no assurance that her children are in a safe
22

environment while she is at work.

To grant single mothers this assurance,

the child care support provisions of ET choices should be continued and

extended beyond one year of employment.

Indeed, assistance with child care

should be extended to a broader group of families

— at

a

minimum, to single

mothers who do not receive AFDC.
c.

Make earnings count

Boosting all women's wages is what is needed, but is a costly
proposition.

The state can however, at relatively low cost, increase women's

effective wages by allowing them to keep more of their AFDC when they do
receive wages and by reducing their income tax burden.

We discuss both of

these options in turn.
i.

"Fill-the-qap" budgeting

An important reform regarding earnings would be to structure benefits so
as to allow women to keep a larger portion of their earnings than currently

allowed.

At present, the disregards (the deductions allowed before AFDC

benefits are replaced by earnings) act as a disincentive to paid work by

minimizing a single-mother's payoff from additional work.

As a result of the

1981 federal OBRA reforms, AFDC benefits are reduced dollar for dollar of

working parent's monthly income, after some adjustments for certain
deductions, except during the first four months of work when benefits are

reduced by 33 1/3 cents for every dollar earned.

Deductions include $90 a

month to cover working expenses (payroll taxes, transportation, clothing,
etc.) and up to $200 per month for child care. For the first year an

additional monthly $30 is also deducted from earnings.

Economists call the degree to which AFDC benefits are reduced for every
additional dollar of income earned the "marginal tax rate."

The deductions in

the formula preclude calculating a uniform marginal tax rate, although it is
not unusual for AFDC mothers to have rates as high as 60%.

In fact, a woman

with a young child earning poverty level wages would not be eligible for AFDC
after four months of work.

As women earn more, they become ineligible for

non-income benefits such as food stamps, and after one year they lose their
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health insurance and most likely their child-care subsidy. It is not difficult
to imagine a variety of scenarios in which a women would be materially worse
off through work, especially if child care is difficult to find.

While the disregard formula is specified by federal regulations, the
state does have some flexibility over the base from which benefits are
deducted.

Currently earnings, after the deduction specified above, are

subtracted from the standard of need
benefit

— to

— currently

set at the maximum AFDC

determine the new AFDC benefit level.

A different "f ill-the-gap"

measure proposed by welfare advocates also reduces benefits with increases in
earned income, but applies a higher "standard of need."

The result of "f ill-

the-gap" budgeting is to deduct the same amount of income as specified in the

disregard formula but deduct from

higher base, resulting in a higher benefit

a

level and a lower marginal tax rate.

Increase the no-tax status threshold
for single-mother families
ii.

Massachusetts income tax treatment of single-mother families with low
earnings is quite discriminatory.
all single filers.

Currently single mothers are treated like

They have the same personal exemptions and the same income

threshold, below which no income taxes must be paid.

This threshold is

referred to in Massachusetts as the "no-tax status" which for single filers is
$8,000 and for joint filers is $12,000.

The thresholds reflect a view that

low-income families should not face income tax liabilities. The level for
joint filers is higher than for single filers to match the larger family size.

While these levels are relatively generous, they treat single-mother families
unfairly, since these families always have more than one person.

For example,

under the current no-tax thresholds, a childless married couple with earnings
of $11,000 (above the poverty line for that family) would pay no income tax

while a single mother with two children making $11,000 (income below the

poverty line for that family) in her job would likely be required to pay state
income taxes. The tax rate on earnings can be as high as 10% on every dollar
she earns above $8,000.

One result of this inequity in the income tax is that single-mother
24

families with income below the poverty line often face positive income tax

Work by one of the authors elsewhere found that in 1988, 25

liabilities.

percent of all single-parent tax filers with income between $5,000 and $10,000
and 80 percent with income between 10,000 and $15,000 had positive income tax

liabilities in 1988 (Albelda 1991).

If the tax threshold for single-parent

families were raised to equal that of joint filers, close to one-third of all

single-parent families would be eligible for no-tax status.

In the last two

years, the state has increased income tax rates, making income tax burdens for

single-mother families with income below the poverty line even more onerous.
B.

Interfamilv transfers; child support
1.

Child support from absent fathers

While absent fathers represent a source of untapped income for many
single-mother families, there are several reasons why this has not proven to
be as successful an avenue of income support as many expected.
10% of never-married mothers are legally entitled to support.

First, only
'

As the AFDC

population consists increasingly of women who are never married, child support
is not likely to provide a promising source of added income, despite increased

efforts to establish paternity.
Second, AFDC mothers are only allowed to keep $50 per month of any child

support payment.

If

the payment exceeds the maximum monthly benefit by $50,

the mother and her family are ineligible for AFDC.

As a result, unless child

support payments are relatively high, AFDC recipients will barely benefit from

increased child support enforcement.
Third, when single mothers do get their awards, they often do not

receive the full amount of spousal support they are entitled to.

In a careful

study on national data, Beller and Graham (1990) found that about 75% of all

eligible families received child support between 1979 and 1986.

Of the women

who received payments, about two thirds got the full amount. Between 1979 and
1987, our data show that the percentage of single-mother families who receive

alimony or child support increased only slightly from 32% to 34% and the
average payment received fell slightly. While Massachusetts mothers receive
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payments that are almost 50% above the national average, this type of income
has not made a substantial difference in single mothers' total income. ^

Child-support payments are decided by court-ordered decisions.

Despite

legislation in 1984 which specified numerical guidelines for child-support
awards, the provisions of the bill allowed the courts to easily ignore them.

As a result, awards (as a percentage of absent fathers' incomes) are very

uneven and rarely reviewed.

The result has been low awards that quickly erode

with inflation.
Federal welfare reform passed in 1988 (the Family Support Act) requires

uidelines to be used and awards to be reviewed every three years.

While these

efforts will surely help, it is unlikely they will help much, particularly if

Consider the amount an absent father

absent fathers are low-income earners.

of two children would have to earn in order to be assessed $590 per month

maximum AFDC benefit for a family of three in Massachusetts.
guidelines, the father's income would have to top $28,000

— far

— the

Under current
beyond the

reach of many absent fathers. 21
2.

Option for reform; Child support assurances from the state

Under current legislation, AFDC mothers receive $50 per month of child
support payments from the state.

States have limited flexibility in the level

of child support payments to AFDC recipients, but Massachusetts would do well

to examine alternative programs similar to those being established in

Wisconsin and New York.

Through special legislation, these two states have

been authorized to use federal funds in child support benefits that otherwise

might have been used for AFDC.

Their goal in doing so has been to establish

an assured child support benefit, initially for AFDC families but conceivably
for all families with children.

Only New York has begun to institute an

assured child support benefit as a pilot program.
The New York program specifies the paternal child support standard
(share of father's income to be paid) and mandates income withholding from the
father.

The person taking care of the child receives either a specified

benefit based on the number of children, or the amount of child support paid
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by the father, whichever is higher.

minimum amount of child support

In this way every child is entitled to a

— regardless

of the contribution made by that

child's father.
C.

Benefit levels
1.

The AFDC shortfall

As we have seen in the preceding sections, poor mothers currently cannot

easily work their way out of poverty, or use child support as a safety net.

AFDC provides the income source of last resort, but this source, as well,
The pre-transfer poverty rate for single-mother families in

falls short.

Massachusetts stands at just under 60 percent.

After accounting for

government transfers, one out of every five poor single-mother families were
pulled out of poverty, resulting in a post-transfer poverty rate of 49 percent
for single-mother families.

As we pointed out above, this contrasts sharply

with elder families: transfer payments boost more than three quarters of pre-

transfer poor ELDERs out of poverty.
2.

Option for reform; Index AFDC to the inflation rate

A key reason elders' benefits provide so much more economic relief than
do those of single mothers is that since the 1970s, Social Security benefits

have been indexed to the inflation rate while AFDC payments have not.

result the average benefit for single mothers

— adjusted

by inflation

As a

— has

eroded 25 percent between 1978 and 1990.
In light of the difficulties single mothers face in improving their

income through paid work, government transfers will continue to represent a
vital income component for many single mothers and their children.

The

reduction in these levels has contributed to poor economic gains of single-

mothers in Massachusetts despite new and expanded employment opportunities.
Our research (and that of others) suggest that benefit levels should be

increased

— or

even expanded to cover more low and moderate income families

with children, similar to programs in most industrialized countries. oo
At a bare minimum, AFDC benefits should be indexed to inflation.

This

simply represents a commitment to maintain already very low real levels of

27

funding

—

an improvement over the current system which requires legislative

approval for any nominal increase.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Massachusetts "miracle" improved incomes for most Massachusetts
families.

But single mothers remained cut off from the earnings opportunities

that benefited other Bay State families, and fell further behind.

Under

current policies, neither earnings, nor child support, nor AFDC benefits are

sufficient to pull Massachusetts single mothers out of poverty.

Massachusetts legislators and policy-makers cannot solve all the
problems single mothers

— and

particularly those dependent on AFDC

— face:

for

example, the Commonwealth cannot single-handedly eliminate wage discrimination
However, there are important steps that Massachusetts can and

against women.
should take.

Work requirements are not likely to help Massachusetts AFDC

mothers earn more, but extending subsidized child care and support for

education will.

By implementing "f ill-the-gap" budgeting and raising the no-

tax threshold for single-mother families, Massachusetts can make single

mothers' earnings count.

State assistance to place a floor under child

support payments would also help ease the plight of single mothers.

Finally,

AFDC benefits should be indexed so that they at least keep pace with
inflation.

Our research shows that even at the peak of the Massachusetts boom,
single mothers did very poorly.

surely doing much worse.

Now,

in the depths of recession, they are

Massachusetts should use the policy instruments at

its disposal to assist single mothers and their children.

It will take more

than a miracle to enable single mothers to meet their families' needs.
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ENDNOTES
1. If the monthly child support payment by absent fathers is less than AFDC
benefits (about half of all single mothers receive AFDC in Massachusetts), the
single-mother family receives only $50 of any monthly child support. Any
amount above $50 is kept by the state.

2. The Census Bureau calls these units "unrelated individuals," not families.
Often "unrelated individuals" (single-member families in our accounting
system) live in households with other people as in the case of roommates or
unmarried couples. Our interest in this study is in the unit that is most
likely to share economic resources. Since the data do not specify the nature
of the relationship of unrelated individuals sharing a household, we have had
to choose one unit over another. We choose families rather than the larger,
more inclusive units households.

—

—

3.

An example is a recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (1990).

A recent study published by the Urban Institute provides a comprehensive
review and critique of the current poverty measure and presents alternatives
(Ruggles 1990)
4.

5. Originally, poverty lines were adjusted for a wide variety of family
compositions and locations: single mother, elder, families with greater
numbers of children, and rural families had lower poverty lines than families
with a father present, non-elder families, families with fewer children (and
more adults) and non-rural families of the same size. Beginning in 1981, some
of these distinctions were abolished.
However, the poverty line is still
adjusted downward when greater numbers of children are present (in families of
a given size), and when the householder in a one- or two-person family is 65
or older.

This is a procedure used similarly by the Congressional Budget Office
(1988) and by Sheldon Danziger, Peter Gottschalk, and Eugene Smolensky (1989)
in their studies of family income.

6.

7. In addition to the economic expansion, other possible reasons why
Massachusetts families fared so much better could be that they gained more
"human capital" the personal characteristics that improve wage-earning
capability like education or experience than the rest of the nation, or that
the racial/ethnic composition of Massachusetts changed since whites have
higher earnings, on average than people of color than the rest of the
country.
However, the evidence rules against these alternative explanations.
While it is true that Massachusetts families, on average, have higher
education levels, older family heads, and a larger percentage that are white
than families in the United States in both 1979 and 1987, the relative
demographic characteristics of families in Massachusetts and the US have
exhibited only minor changes. From this, we conclude that the large jump in
Massachusetts adjusted income is largely attributable to the improved economic
performance in the state relative to that of the rest of the United States,
rather than human capital or demographic changes in Massachusetts.

—

—

—
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—

8.

These growth figures differ from the growth in actual incomes in Table A.
Adjusted income takes into account family size.

in Appendix A.

Part of the difference is probably due to the fact that the heads of MAR-NC
However, when we
and MAR-C families are older, more experienced workers.
control for the head's experience and education, the differences are still
statistically significant. For more information on this and other analyses
discussed in the footnotes see Appendix B.
9.

10. The number of hours worked by single mothers is smaller than the total
number of hours for MOM families, given above, because the total includes
hours worked by other family members as well.
11. Our findings parallel those in scores of other labor market studies on the
wage difference between women and men. These studies find that even after
adjusting for demographic characteristics such as age, experience, race, and
education, at least half of the original wage difference remains.
In other
words, there is a large and persistent wage gap between men and women that
cannot be explained by acquired work skills. A good summary of some of these
studies is found in Hartmann and Treiman (1981; pp. 36-37).

12. This sample used was all principal

(heads or wives) women in families ages

18-64.
13. Hourly earnings are imputed from the data set since total hours worked per
week are only available for one-quarter of the national sample.
Instead, we
assigned 20 hours a week to those reporting part-time work and 40 hours a week
to those reporting full-time work and then determined hourly earnings with
reported total earnings and weeks worked.
If in fact white women work less
hours than black women in either full-time or part-time jobs, then we have
underestimated white women's hourly wages.
14. Technically, the data presented in Table 8 is for single mothers receiving
AFDC or other public assistance since the CPS data does not distinguish among
them (for example between AFDC and General Relief income it does separate
Supplemental Security Income, however). For single-mothers in Massachusetts,
almost all public assistance comes in the form of AFDC.

—

15. This result comes from a shift-share analysis.
The analysis decomposes
the change in annual earnings by each family member into four components:
changes in the probability of working at all, changes in average weeks worked
if working, changes in average weekly wage, plus an interaction term.
In
addition to an increase in average weekly wage between 1979 and 1987, these
was an increase in the average weeks worked by those at work. However, this
effect was offset by an overall decrease in the probability of working and a
(small) negative interaction term.
Interestingly, the picture for 1973-79 was
quite different: the relatively small earnings increase was driven by women's
growing probability of working and the rising number of weeks worked by women,
while average weekly wages fell.
16. Between 1973 and 1979, however, MOMs augmented their average weeks worked
by 8.8 weeks.
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17. For a summary of Massachusetts cash transfers in income maintenance
programs relative to other states see Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (1990).
In addition, several evaluations of the ET Choices program have been conducted
in the last few years by the Massachusetts Taxpayers' Foundation (1987), Urban
Institute (Nightingale, et. al. 1990) and the Heritage Foundation (O'Neill

1990)

Only one welfare-employment evaluation study to date has looked at the
impact of education on earnings and receipt of AFDC.
In their study of ET,
Nightingale, et. al. found that ET participants enrolled in educational
programs earned less and reduced benefits less than other ET participants.
This is not a surprising finding since follow-up was conducted only for up to
18 months and women in school, by definition, have limited work hours.
18.

19. Reported in Garfinkel (1990) from a 1979 Census study of child support
payments.

20. If Massachusetts single mothers got the full amount of child support they
were entitled to, how much would it boost their incomes? To answer this
question, assume, based on Beller and Graham's estimates, that 75% of eligible
MOMs in Massachusetts received child support, and that two-thirds of those
received the complete amount. Further, make the conservative assumption that
the remaining third received on average only one-third of what they were
entitled to. Then providing full support to all eligible MOMs would have
improved their average income by $1,125 in 1987.
21. By way of comparison, the average income of all single men in
Massachusetts was $26,863 in 1987.

22. Many social science researchers have reached this conclusion.
example, Ellwood (1988), Burtless (1990).
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APPENDIX A: Average poverty levels, average money income, and "adjusted"
income by source for all family types in Massachusetts and the US 1979 and
1987

TABLE A.l

Average poverty line income of Massachusetts
and US families by family type 1979 and 1987
US Average
Poverty line
1987
1979

Massachusetts Average
Poverty line
Familv tvoe

MAR-NC
MALE-NC
MAR-C
ELDER
FEMALE-NC
FEMALE-C

1979

1987

$5,457
3,912
7,903
4,125
3,619
5,942

$8,496
5,909
11,894
6,419
5,909
8,496

$5,203
3,905
7,706
4,046
3,619
5,892

$8,262
5,909
11,871
6,362
5,909
9,164

5,611

8,355

5,524

8,402

Total

NOTE: In 1979 the Census Bureau still adjusted the poverty line downward for
female-headed families and families who lived on farms.

Source

;

Authors' computation from CPS tapes.

TABLE A.
Average money income (in 1987 dollars) of Massachusetts
and US families by family type 1979 and 1987

Massachusetts Average
Money income
Percent
1979
1987
Change

Family
type

US Average
Money Income
Percent
1979
1987
Chan ge

MAR-NC
$44,831
MALE-NC
19,727
MAR-C
40,976
ELDER
16,535
FEMALE-NC 16,664
FEMALE-C
12,904

51,210
26,863
50,270
20,404
20,876
13,214

14.2%
36.2
22.7
23.4
25.3
2.4

$39,532
17,825
35,075
16,086
14,151
14,242

$42,108
20,573
40,874
18,835
16,354
13,807

6.5%
15.4
16.5
17.1
15.6
-3.1

Total

34,945

16.5

28,337

29,514

4.2

Source

30,004
;

Authors' computation from CPS tapes.
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APPENDIX

B:

Cross-sectional regression versus average "adjusted" earnings

It is possible that the earnings differences we observe among family

types may reflect the contributions of other variables correlated with family
structure.

For example, single mothers have a high probability of being black

or Latina, which may help to explain low earnings levels.

To address this

concern we used cross-sectional regression analysis to control for a number of

variables in addition to family structure to explain adjusted income level.
The independent variables in our ordinary least squares regression included
the head's educational attainment, head's age and age squared, head's race and

Hispanic ethnicity, degree of urbanization (central city, suburban rural), as
well as dummy variables representing the six family types.

After controlling for the variables listed above, the rank order is
little changed. Pairwise comparison of the coefficients within each year

indicates that virtually all of the interfamily differences remain significant

after controlling for other variables. In most cases the magnitude of the

difference between a given family type's earnings and those of the MAR-C base
group is about half or more of the raw earnings difference.

Thus a

substantial part of earnings differences among family types appears to result
from family structure, not other variables.

ELDERs show the largest change in adjusted income relative to MAR-Cs.
Since the regressions include head's age and age squared as independent
variables, this suggests that

— not

surprisingly

—a

substantial part of the

earnings gap between ELDERs and MAR-NCs can be explained by age.

This

corresponds to a typical "age-earnings profile" in which after a certain age,

earnings decrease.
Table B below compares two measures of how much a given family type's
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income differs from that of MAR-NC families:

1)

the raw difference between the

family type's mean income and MAR-NC 's mean income (labelled "Mean") and 2)
the coefficient on a dummy variable for each family type (using MAR-NCs as the

omitted dummy) from a cross-section regression of family income on a variety

Families are ranked in order of

of family characteristics (labelled "Coeff").

annual adjusted income in 1987.

TABLE B
Mean annual income by family type compared with estimated
coefficients on family type dummies
(standard errors in parentheses)

Family types
ELDER

FEMALE-C

Mean
-2.30

-2.28

1979
Coeff.
-1.23
(0.27)

Mean
-3.12

-1.58

-2.97

1987

(0.28)

(0.23)

FEMALE-NC

-0.95

-0.44

Coeff
-1.29

-1.89
(0.25)

-0.97

-0.85
(0.19)

(0.18)

MAR-C

MALE-NC

-0.11

0.05

0.20

MAR-NC

1.67

1.68

1.47

(0.15)

Source;

0.41
(0.19)

(0.17)

1.58
(0.16)

Authors' computations from CPS tapes.
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